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First Interim Report - Public Consultation on Draft Constitution

 

The purpose of this report is to document a consolidated list of issues that have arisen in the course of the Public Consultation exercise.

Areas of main concern for the present:
1.    That the Constitution gives disproportionate powers to the founding organisations:
a)    The founding organisations have “too much” representation in the proposed Executive Board – this relates to each organisation having six of its nominees on the Executive Board.

b)    The founding organisations have “too long” a period with special powers of nominations and representation – this relates to 2050 in Article 8 (c) (g) & Article 14(b).

c)    The founding fathers have “excessive control” on the MINAB – this relates to appointment of Vice Chairs in Article 11 (a) sic.
2.    That the Constitution does not facilitate a “democratic framework”:
a)    There is no mechanism to audit the founding organisations for their own democratic structure – this relates to the rationale for having founding organisations that are democratic and representative.

b)    There is no process to ensure that the power of nominations vested in the founding organisations is exercised in accordance with the “Intent” of the MINAB as set out in Article 1.

c)    There is no clarity on how the Executive Board will use its powers of Co-option under Article 8(h).

d)     With reference to Article 8(i) there is no procedure which will determine who and how “four persons” from the Shia Muslim community will be co-opted if the representation of the Shia Muslim community on the Executive Board falls below 20%.

e)    “Election” process is not defined.
3.    That the Constitution “fails” in  giving space and representation to women and the youth:

a)    There is no “reserved constituency” for women and students as there is for the Shia Muslim community.

b)    As delegates to the General Council will come from the membership of the MINAB – mosques, Islamic centres, institutions involved in the training of Imams or Islamic Teachers, there is little or less chance of women and young person’s being nominated delegates. Their absence or minimal presence in that for a will be a big impediment to them being successful in getting to the Executive Board through election. Consideration needs to be given to imposing requirements on the founding organisations to use their nominating powers in such a way as to ensure that women and young persons are represented in the Executive Board.

c)    The power of co-option as set out in Article 8(h) needs to give more emphasis to gender and less to reflection of balance on schools of thought in Islam.

4.    The Constitution does not make it clear that the MINAB will have no role or remit in matters of Islamic theology.

a)    Detractors of the MINAB raised issues on whether the MINAB will have any role in imposing unity in Eid celebrations.

b)    Again whether the MINAB will issue directions on what to do during Muharram and Ashura or making “salam” in mosques.

5.    The Constitution lacks clarity in defining the relationship of the MINAB with governmental and regulatory bodies such as the Charity Commission, the Department of Social Cohesion and the Immigration Department of the Home Office with particular reference to Article 2 (k).

a)    As an independent body the MINAB should accept no power or privilege of “certification” or “endorsement”.

b)    In any conflict that a member or members have with the authorities the MINAB should assist the member and not take side of the authority.

Khurshid Drabu